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PATRICK MCDADE, ESQ.

The United States and Iran – Decades of
Animosity: An Analysis of the Path to the
Current Conflict
ABSTRACT:
Lost in the international debate raging around Iran’s
burgeoning nuclear weapons program is the deep and
complex history that exists between the United States and
Iran, as well as the legal rights and responsibilities that
exist between the two nations. A thorough examination of
the intensely adversarial relationship that has developed
over the past sixty years must be undertaken before any
path to a diplomatic solution is likely to succeed. The
historical evidence clearly shows that Iran’s animosity
towards and distrust of the United States is entirely
justified, and the United States’ mistrust of Iran is equally
well-grounded. Due these decades of animosity and
mistrust, the United States is likely to ignore the significant
legal arguments available to Iran under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and take military action when Iran
refuses to back down before an enemy nation.
The article examines all of these issues and
ultimately concludes that a high likelihood of armedconflict exists in this situation, which will almost definitely
result in a protracted regional war. This article then
considers these historical, legal, and diplomatic realities to
suggest significant and creative changes in the diplomatic
approach to Iran are necessary to prevent the United States
from entering into yet another armed-conflict in the
Middle-East.
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Introduction
Despite significant international condemnation and
decades of sanctions, the Republic of Iran continues to defy
the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter
"IAEA"), the United Nations Security Council, and the
United States regarding its suspected nuclear weapons
program. In response, Israel and the United States are
preparing a military solution to disable Iran’s nuclear
weapons program before Iran actually develops a working
nuclear weapon. This current crisis is only the most recent
conflict between the United States and Iran, as there is a
deep, complex, and strongly adversarial history between
the two nations. This history must be considered, along
with the current diplomatic, legal, and military postures of
the nations, to determine whether military conflict is
probable in this circumstance and to analyze what steps
may still be taken to avoid further war in the Middle-East.
This article examines the current state of tension between
the United States and Iran; the historical and legal
relationships behind the hostilities that fuel the current
conflict; the likelihood of military action arising from the
current crisis; and the best path to avoid a potential war
between the United States and Iran.
I. The United States and Iran on the Precipice of War
On February 24, 2012, the IAEA published a report
(hereinafter "IAEA 2012 Report") which concluded:
[T]he Agency is unable to
provide credible assurance
about
the
absence
of
63

undeclared nuclear material
and activities in Iran, and
therefore to conclude that all
nuclear material in Iran is in
peaceful activities…. The
Agency continues to have
serious concerns regarding
possible military dimensions
to
Iran’s
nuclear
programme….1

This finding by the IAEA throws into dire focus the
recently expanding international tensions between the
United States, Israel, and Iran. These tensions arise from
Iran’s continued aggressive rhetoric against Israel,2 its
direct support of terrorist groups,3 and its failure to abide
by United Nations Security Council Resolutions4 regarding
1

IAEA, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, GOV/2012/9 (2012), at 10-11 (2012).
2
Nazila Fathi, Wipe Israel “Off the Map” Iranian says, N.Y.
TIMES , Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26ihtiran.html?pagewanted=print; Nasser Karimi, Iran’s Ahmadinejad: No
Place for Israel in Region, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 26, 2011,
http://news.yahoo.com/irans-ahmadinejad-no-place-israel-region101047532.html (quoting Ahmadinejad addressing Israel, “There is no
room for you in the region”).
3
For an explanation and analysis of Iran’s support of Islamic
terrorism see EDGAR O’BALANCE, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST
TERRORISM, 1979-1995:THE IRANIAN CONNECTION (1997); AMIR
TAHERi, HOLY TERROR: THE INSIDE STORY OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM
(1987).
4
See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (Jul. 31, 2006); S.C.
Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Apr. 28, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc.
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its violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter the “NPT”).5 Further, Iran
has consistently refused to comply with the IAEA despite
significant sanctions placed upon Iran by the United
Nations Security Council.6 The United States has also
implemented unilateral sanctions on the Iranian oil
industry7 and banks dealing with Iran.8 These sanctions are
having significant impact on the Iranian economy,9 yet Iran
remains defiant and continues to develop its nuclear
program.10

S/RES/1835 (Sep. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929
(Jun. 9, 2010).
5
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jul. 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.S.T. 161. [Hereinafter the NPT].
6
Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Imposes
Additional Sanctions on Iran, U.N. Press Release SC/9948 (June 9,
2010).
7
Steve Hargreaves, U.S. Tightens Oil Sanctions on Iran, CNN
MONEY, (Mar. 31, 2012)
http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/30/news/international/Iransanctions/index.htm.
8
Laura MacInnis, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Banks Dealing with
Iran, REUTERS, (Dec. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/31/us-iran-usa-obamaidUSTRE7BU0GP20111231; U.S. Department of the Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control, What You Need To Know About U.S.
Economic Sanctions, (Jan. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf.
9
Rick Gladstone, Iran Admits Western Sanctions are Inflicting
Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/middleeast/iran-admitswestern-sanctions-are-inflicting-damage.html?_r=1.
10
Palash R. Gosh, Iran Vows to Pursue Nuclear Energy in
Defiance of Western Sanctions, Military Threats, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-vows-pursue-nuclearenergy-defiance-western-sanctions-military-threats-432790.
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Even prior to the IAEA 2012 Report, the prospect
of Israel taking military action against Iran was openly
discussed in diplomatic circles. Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu warned that a military strike by Israel
against Iran’s nuclear facilities was “a question of when,
not if.”11 While Israel’s threats towards Iran were initially
decried by its allies,12 the United States has now joined
with Israel in support of possible military strikes against
Iran’s nuclear facilities.13 This potential for military
conflict grows more imminent as Israeli leaders believe that
Iran’s nuclear weapons program "is steadily approaching
maturation and is verging on a ‘zone of immunity’ — a
position from which the Iranian regime could complete its
program without effective disruption, at its convenience.”14
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized
11

Palash R. Ghosh, Israeli Minister Tells China Strike on Iran
Isn’t Ruled Out, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2012),http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/315435/20120316/china-israeliran-nuclear-strike-lieberman-relations.htm.
12
Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes and Jay Soloman, U.S. Warns
Israel on Strike, Officials Lobby Against Attack on Iran as Military
Leaders Bolster Defenses, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Jan. 14, 2012)
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409004577159202
556087074.html.
13
Chris McGreal, Obama Warns Iran as He Seeks to Reassure
Israel Ahead of Crucial Talks, In Advance of Meeting with Israeli PM
Binyamin Netanyahu, Obama Said He Hopes Israel Understands ‘I
Don’t Bluff’ on Iran, THE GUARDIAN (Mar 2, 2012) available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/02/obama-warns-iranreassures-israel.
14
Israel: Iran Nuke Site Soon Immune to Strike, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Mar. 19, 2012, 11:48 AM), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57399943/israel-iran-nukesite-soon-immune-to-strike/ (quoting Israeli Defense Minister Ehud
Barak).
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this position during his September 27, 2012, address at the
United Nations, as he literally drew a red line depicting the
deadline for military intervention to occur if Iran's nuclear
weapons program is to be disrupted.15
Iran has not sat idle while Israel and the United
States stepped up their aggressive rhetoric. For instance,
Iran rattled its sabre by deploying naval vessels through the
Suez Canal for the first time since the Iranian Revolution of
1979.16 Iran has also begun deploying submarines and
boats that could be used in suicide bomber style attacks
against the American Fifth Fleet; which is stationed in the
area to ensure the openness of the strategic Strait of
Hormuz.17 Most recently, Iran confirmed its direct military
support of Hamas through the supply of arms and missile
technology intended for use against Israel, in violation of
U.N. Sanctions.18 These actions lend credence to Iranian
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s warning that

15

Jeffery Heller, Netanyahu Draws "Red Line" on Iran's Nuclear
Program, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2012) available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-un-assembly-israel-iranidUSBRE88Q0GI20120927.
16
Iranian Naval Vessels Enter Suez Canal, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 22, 2011) available at
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/02/21/official-iran-naval-shipsenter-suez-canal/
17
Warda Al-Jawahiry, U.S. Navy: Iran Prepares Suicide Boats in
Gulf, REUTERS (Feb.12, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/12/us-gulf-usa-iranidUSTRE81B0V220120212.
18
Ashish Kumar Sen, Iran Admits Giving Hamas Technology for
Missiles, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2012) available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/21/iran-admitsgiving-hamas-technology-for-missiles/?page=1.
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Iran will strike back with equal force if attacked by the
United States or Israel.19
With increasingly inflammatory and hawkish
rhetoric being mirrored by strategic military deployments
and the staging of forces off the coast of Iran, armed
conflict between the United States and Iran appears more
and more imminent. War games indicate that a military
strike on Iran's nuclear sites will likely escalate beyond the
single incident and lead to a wider regional war with the
United States as a participant.20 While a diplomatic
resolution is still a possibility, the United States appears to
be on the cusp of entering into, yet, another war in the
Middle East. With war as a distinct possibility, it is
important to examine the history and relationship between
Iran and the United States that has led them to this
precipice.
II. The United States and the 1953 Coup D’état of
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh
Prior to 1953, relations between the United States
and Iran were quite different than the heated opposition that
exists today. Iran considered the United States to be “a
distant but reliable ally” that Iran hoped could be “a
19

Ramin Mostaghim and Emily Alpert, Iran’s Supreme Leader
Warns of Retaliation if Israel or U.S. Strikes, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2012, 1:20 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/iran-nowruzstrike-back-israel.html.
20
Mark Mazzetti & Thom Shanker, U.S. War Games Sees Perils of
Israeli Strike Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/united-stateswar-game-sees-dire-results-of-an-israeli-attack-oniran.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
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counterbalancing force against Iran’s two colonial nemesis:
the Russians and the British.”21 Russia retained power in
the northern provinces and Britain held sway in the
southern and western areas of the country throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.22
At the
conclusion of World War II, a power struggle between
Great Britain and the Soviet Union was brewing in Iran, as
both nations realized the military and economic
significance of the country.
Iran was strategically
significant due to its central location in the Middle-East and
its newly discovered oil resources, which left neither nation
willing to withdraw their troops.23 President Franklin
Roosevelt assisted Iran by meeting with Winston Churchill
and Joseph Stalin in Tehran to insist that all foreign troops
be withdrawn from Iran and that the three nations respect
Iran’s territorial integrity and national autonomy.24 In
response, the United States and Britain withdrew their
troops and the Soviets followed suit; leaving Iran an
impoverished, but technically independent, nation.25 Due
to the American intervention with Great Britain and Russia
and their shared history as British colonies, many Iranians
viewed the United States as a protector in international
matters.26
21

ABBAS MILANI, THE MYTH OF THE GREAT SATAN, A NEW LOOK
AT AMERICA’S RELATIONS WITH IRAN, 43 (2010).
22
BADI BADIOZAMANI & GHAZAL BADIOZAMANI, IRAN AND
AMERICA, RE-KINDLING A LOST LOVE, 187-98 (2005).
23
KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE, THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN IRAN AND AMERICA 49 (2004).
24
DAVID FARBER, TAKEN HOSTAGE, THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
AND AMERICA’S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH RADICAL ISLAM 48 (2005).
25
26

Id. at 48-49.
Id.
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Though Iran was no longer a colony of the British
Empire in 1949, the nation remained strongly in the sway
of the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(hereinafter “AIOC”).
The AIOC held concessions
negotiated by Reza Shah, the previous monarch of Iran,
which gave it rights to the development of Iran’s vast oil
resources.27 The terms of this concession, however, were
quite inequitable compared to similar arrangements
between other Western powers and Middle-Eastern nations.
For example, the Arabian-American Oil Company shared
profits between Saudi-Arabia and the United States on a
fifty-fifty basis.28 In contrast, the AIOC, with annual
profits of approximately two-hundred and fifty million
pounds, paid Iran only thirty-seven million pounds under
the concession.29 The economic mistreatment of Iran by
Britain was also felt at a personal level by employees of the
AIOC:
The working conditions of
the
AIOC’s
Iranian
employees
were
unconscionable: they were
paid 50 cents per day and
lived in a shantytown called
Kaghazabad (“paper city,”
for the principal means of
construction) without running
water or electricity… They
lived during the seven hot
27

STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN, AN AMERICAN COUP
AND THE ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR 51-52 (2003).
28
POLLACK, supra note 23, at 54.
29

Id. at 50.
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months of the year under the
trees… In winter times these
masses moved into big halls,
built by the company,
housing up to 3,000 to 4,000
people without wall or
partition between them. Each
family occupied the space of
one blanket. There were no
lavatories…30

The AIOC’s rapacious policies combined with the
totalitarian abuses of Mohammad Reza Shah, the Iranian
Monarch, led to a volatile political situation which gave
rise to an opposition political movement called the National
Front in October of 1949.31
The Rise of Mohammed Mossadegh
The National Front was a political party led by
Mohammad Mossadegh, an elder statesman of Iranian
politics known for his populist and anti-British stances.
The National Front was born from a successful sit-in
protest objecting to improper elections of the Majlis
(Iranian Parliament) that were rigged by Mohammad Reza
Shah.32 When new, fair elections were held, Mohammad
Mossadegh and six other founders of the National Front
were elected to the Majlis marking the rise of an organized,
sophisticated opposition party that was “fired with

30

Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.
32
KINZER, supra note 27, at 71.
31

71

nationalistic zeal and confident of broad public support.”33
The primary goal of Mossadegh and the National Front was
to apply their new-found political might to renegotiate the
terms of AIOC’s oil concession.34 Initially, Mossadegh
wanted a similar arrangement to the agreement between the
United States and Saudi Arabia, which would result in a
fifty fifty profit split and transparency in the accounting
procedures.35
The British immediately rejected this
proposition and strong-armed Mohammed Reza Shah into a
new concession that addressed none of Mossadegh’s
concerns. The new concession merely increased the
minimum annual royalty payment to four million pounds,
and made vague promises about training more Iranians for
administrative roles.36 The Shah attempted to force
through this new agreement; however it was roundly
rejected by the Majlis, which was controlled by Mossadegh
and the National Front.37
While the Shah attempted to negotiate more
acceptable terms with the British, the political struggle
between the National Front and the Shah continued.
Mossadegh and the National Front grew more and more
entrenched against the British and focused upon the
nationalization of the oil industry as the best solution.38
After about a year and a half of stalemate, the British
offered terms similar to the Arabian-American oil
concession; however it was too late.
The popular
33

Id.
POLLACK, supra note 23, at 53.
35
Id. at 54.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
BADIOZAMANI, supra note 22.
34
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movement against British colonialism had been inflamed to
the point of no return. On March 8, 1951, pro-British
Iranian Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated by a
religious zealot who stated he wished to “deliver the
deprived Moslem people of Iran from foreign serfdom.”39
This act was the catalyst for change that would bring
Mossadegh to power. One week after the assassination,
Mossadegh lead the Majlis in a unanimous vote to
nationalize AIOC.40 On April 15, 1951, the British closed
AIOC’s Abadan oil refinery. 41 On April 28, Mohammed
Mossadegh became Prime Minister of Iran.42
As Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh became
the first truly democratic leader in the history of Iran,
establishing a record of positive democratic change that
resulted in him becoming the most popular figure in
Among the changes that
modern Iranian history.43
Mossadegh put in place wer: significant advances in
women’s suffrage in Iran;44 outlawing forced labors of
peasants on the estates of their landlords; establishing
benefits to be paid to sick and injured factory workers; and
defending religious freedoms.45 “Above all, [Mossadegh]
was known even by his enemies as scrupulously honest and

39

Id.
KINZER, supra note 27, at 79.
41
BADIOZAMANI, supra note 22.
42
Id.
43
KINZER, supra note 27, at 7.
44
Shiva Falsafi, Civil Society and Democracy in Japan, Iran, Iraq,
and Beyond, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 421 (2010).
45
KINZER, supra note 27, at 140.
40
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impervious to the corruption that pervaded Iranian
politics.”46
Mossadegh found himself in a unique position in
the history of Iran to bring about radical and positive
change; with his popularity and reputation for integrity
politically insurmountable by his opponents. When the
Shah challenged Mossadegh’s authority to appoint the
Minister of War, an appointment traditionally made by the
Shah, Mossadegh refused to acquiesce and instead resigned
as prime minister.47 While the British initially celebrated
the Shah’s apparent return to authority, the people rejected
the Shah's replacement of Mossadegh with the pro-British
Ahmad Qavam and massive protests bubbled into a near
revolution.48 Mossadegh was re-established as Prime
Minister within four days of his resignation and the Shah
agreed to remain as royalty, but consented not to rule.49
With the monarchy now a ceremonial accent to his
democratic government, Mossadegh began his reforms in
earnest and the nationalization of AIOC would not be
overturned.
The British would not simply allow their oil
company to be nationalized, however. A large contingent
of British warships was quickly stationed off the coast of
Iran near the Abadan refinery,50 instituting an embargo on
Iranian oil under the assertion that the oil was stolen British

46

Id.
POLLACK, supra note 23, at 61-62.
48
Id. at 62.
49
Id.
50
KINZER, supra note 27, at 111.
47
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property.51 Great Britain then appealed to the United
Nations for support on their position,52 despite the United
States, through a letter from Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, strongly advising against such a maneuver.53
Acheson had long been seeking a diplomatic solution to the
growing tensions between Iran and Great Britain and
viewed taking the issue to the United Nations as a step that
would lead to “an irrevocable freezing of the Iranian
Situation.”54 Acheson proved correct as the great stage of
the United Nations provided Mossadegh with exactly the
forum he needed play the role of David against the Goliath
of Great Britain. Mossadegh travelled to New York to
personally present Iran’s case to the United Nations
resulting in a referral of the matter to the World Court
where Iran would prove victorious.55 The true victory for
Mossadegh, however, was that he was able to present Iran
to the world as a sympathetic victim of British colonialism.
Mossadegh's success at the United Nations and apparent
victory over Britain resulted in his selection as Time
Magazine’s Man of the Year.56
After his sessions with the United Nations,
Mossadegh extended his stay in the United States and met
at length with Secretary Acheson and President Harry

51

Id. at 116.
BADIOZAMANI, supra note 22, at 244.
53
KINZER, supra note 27, at 117.
54
Id.
55
BADIOZAMANI ET AL., supra note 22, at 244.
56
1951 Man of the Year: Mohammed Mossadegh, TIME MAG. (Jan.
7, 1952), available at
http://mohsen.banan.1.byname.net/content/republished/doc.public/politi
cs/iran/mossadeq/1951TimesManOfTheYear/main.pdf.
52

75

Truman. Staying in Washington D.C. for nearly a month,
Mossadegh participated in more than seventy hours of talks
with the United States while the parties attempted to find a
diplomatic solution to the ongoing conflict between Britain
and Iran.57 Prime Minister Mossadegh left the United
States with a confidence in the friendship of the United
States, as President Truman expressed a deep sympathy for
the Iranian position.58 However, President Truman also
expressed that the United States was concerned that the
Soviet Union could use the conflict with Britain as an
opportunity to seize Iran and start a world war, a concern
that would eventually be Mossadegh's undoing.59
Operation Ajax: The Fall of Mohammed Mossadegh
The election of Winston Churchill to his second
stint as Prime Minister of England in 1951, would be the
beginning of the end for Mohammed Mossadegh. During
his campaign, Churchill’s position on Iran was clear and
poignant as he charged that sitting Prime Minister Clement
Atlee “had scuttled and run from Abadan when a splutter of
musketry would have ended the matter.”60 Churchill
described Mohammed Mossadegh as “an elderly lunatic
bent on wrecking his own country and handing it over to
the Communists.”61 Even worse for Mossadegh, the
friendly relations between the United States and Iran cooled
significantly with the election of the vehemently anticommunist Dwight Eisenhower as President, who did not
57

KINZER, supra note 27, at 130.
Id. at 129.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 132.
61
Id.
58

76

share his predecessor’s sympathies for Iran. Mossadegh
exacerbated this cooling in relations when he implied to
President Eisenhower that without American intervention
against the British oil embargo, Iran could fall victim to
communist takeover. 62 Rather than bring Eisenhower to
the aid of Iran, this ploy pushed Eisenhower towards his
old friend Winston Churchill’s position that Iran was on a
path towards falling to the Soviet Union.63 Likewise, while
former Secretary of State Dean Acheson had strongly
resisted the proposition of aiding the British in a coup
against Mossadegh,64 Eisenhower’s Secretary of State
Foster Dulles and Central Intelligence Agency Director
Allen Dulles, brothers, were ready to join the British in a
move against Mossadegh immediately after Eisenhower
took office in 1953.65
As the British had been generally expelled from
Iran, they were not in a position to directly sponsor a coup
against Mossadegh. Instead, the United States would lead
the effort; the CIA chose Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of
President Theodore Roosevelt, as the officer to lead the
coup d'état against Prime Minister Mohammed
Mossadegh.66 The coup was code-named Operation Ajax
and was chronicled in great detail by CIA Historian Dean

62

JOHN W. LIMBERT, NEGOTIATING WITH IRAN – WRESTLING THE
GHOSTS OF HISTORY 75 (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009).
63
Id.
64
Robert L. Beisner, Dean’s List: Power, Institutions, and
Archesonian Diplomacy – Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, 103
AM. J. INT’L L. 375, 379 (2006).
65
KINZER, supra note 27, at 152.
66
Id. at 4.
77

L. Dodge.67 Dodge’s history was based on an assortment
of documents including the writings of CIA operative
Donald N. Wilbur, who was directly involved in the
operation.68
Operation Ajax was hatched in a joint venture
between the British SIS and the American CIA, with the
CIA taking the lead in both planning and execution.69 The
CIA selected Iranian General Zahedi as the person most
likely to be able to succeed Mossadegh as Prime Minister,
and formed a plan to remove Mossadegh from power and
put Zahedi in place.70 The decision was based on the
following facts and assumptions:
[T]hat Zahedi alone of
potential candidates had the
vigor and courage to make
him worthy of support; that
the Shah must be brought
into the operation; that the
Shah would act only with
great reluctance but that he
could be forced to do so; that
if the issue was clear-cut the
armed forces would follow
67

The New York Times would eventually acquire the Dodge’s
History and publish excerpts on April 16, 2000, prompting the eventual
declassification and release of the history. See James Risen, How a Plot
Convulsed Iran in ’53 (and in ’79), N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 16, 2000,
http://nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-intro.html.
68
Dr. Donald N. Wilbur, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,
November 1952-August 1953, CIA Clandestine Service History (March
1954),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/#documents.
69
Id. at 6.
70
Id. at 3-4.
78

the
Shah
rather
than
Mossadeq; that the operation
must, if possible, be made to
appear legal or quasi-legal
instead of an outright coup;
that public opinion must be
fanned to fever pitch against
Mossadeq in the period just
preceding the execution of
the overthrow operation; that
the military aspect would be
successful only if the station
were able to review the plan
with Iranians chosen by
Zahedi to execute it…71
The primary Iranian agents to be used were known as the
Rashidan brothers: SIS contacts who had strong
connections with the armed forces, Majlis, religious
leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and other
influential figures.72 From the United States, Kermit
Roosevelt was joined by General Norman Schwarzkopf
(the father of the General of the Gulf War) who would
apply pressure, in conjunction with the Shah’s sister, to
gain the Shah’s reluctant cooperation.73
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The coup would be preceded by a vast
disinformation campaign; with the CIA taking over Iranian
newspapers to publish anti-Mossadegh propaganda. The
operation plan specifically outlined the following steps:
The material designed to
discredit Mossadeq will
hammer
the
following
themes:
(a) Mossadeq favors the
Tudeh Party and the USSR.
(This will be supported by
black documents.)
(b) Mossadeq is an enemy of
Islam since he associates with
the Tudeh and advances their
aims.
(c) Mossadeq is deliberately
destroying the morale of the
Army and its ability to
maintain order.
(d) Mossadeq is deliberately
fostering the growth of
regional separatist elements
through his removal of Army
control over tribal areas. One
of the aims of the removal of
control by the Army is to
make it easier for the Soviets
to take over the Northern
Provinces.
80

(e) Mossedeq is deliberately
leading the country into
economic collapse.
(f) Mossadeq has been
corrupted by power to such
an extent that no trace is left
of the fine man of earlier
years, and he now has all the
repressive instincts of the
dictator.
(g) Consistent with these
themes will be the persistent
slant that Mossadeq has been
the unwitting victim of his
scrupulous,
personally
ambitious advisers.74
In addition to corrupting the press, Operation Ajax
depended on the bribing and pressuring of Mossadegh's
opposition, which included a variety of political parties and
bazaar merchants, who controlled street gangs, to aid in the
spread of unrest and propaganda.75 Further, Operation
Ajax would recruit Islamic leaders and extremists,
including terrorist elements, to engage in the public support
of Zahedi and the Shah, protests against Mossadegh, and
even terrorist action against Mossadegh and his
government.76 The plan then detailed exactly how all of
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the elements would be used in concert in order to bring
about the fall of Mossadegh and bring Zahedi into power.77
After weeks of subversive propaganda and
demonstrations as directed by the Operation Ajax operation
plan, the Shah finally gave in to months of pressure from
his sister, General Schwarzkopf, Kermit Roosevelt and
numerous others, and joined the plot against Mossadegh.
On August 13, 1953, the Shah signed legal-seeming royal
decrees, drawn up by Roosevelt, called firman that
purported to dismiss Mossadegh and appoint General
Zahedi as the new Prime Minister.78 With the firman
providing an appearance of legality, Operation Ajax
launched into execution on August 15, 1953, and
immediately appeared to have failed as large parts of the
military and government maintained their loyalty to
Mossadegh.79 Mossadegh’s government began issuing
radio broadcasts condemning the coup attempt, General
Zahedi went into hiding, and the Shah fled the country.80
With the apparent failure of the coup being broadcast for
the world to hear, Roosevelt and his fellow operatives were
instructed to desist attempting to overthrow the Mossadegh
government and flee Iran.81
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Mossadegh,
however,
made
a
political
miscalculation.
In response to the coup attempt,
Mossadegh attempted to solidify his government by
enacting a referendum of dubious constitutionality, which
stated that an improbable majority of Iranian citizens had
voted to dissolve the Majlis -- a power which only the Shah
possessed.82 Further, Mossadegh’s government issued
statements denying the authenticity of the firman.83 These
two actions, combined with the ongoing propaganda
campaign against Mossadegh, created questions of the
legitimacy of Mossadegh’s position. When it was revealed
that the firman actually existed84 and the Shah spoke
publically in Iraq. He stated that he had fled a coup attempt
by Mossadegh against the royalty and Prime Minister
Zahedi,85 and Kermit Roosevelt had the tools he needed to
revive the coup.86 Over the next four days, Roosevelt and
his operatives spun the story of the attempted coup upon
Mossadegh into a story of betrayal and revolution by
Mossadegh against the Shah, with the resulting
misinformation fanning the chaos in Tehran against
Mossadegh.87
On August 19, 1953, with the Rashidan Brothers
fanning the flames of dissent and organizing mass riots and
demonstrations throughout Tehran, sections of the military
loyal to General Zahidi took control of the city.88 Soon the
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telegraph office and Radio Tehran were taken by royalists
under the guidance of Operation Ajax, and the propaganda
machine was then able to present Zahidi with the firman to
legitimize his claims that Mossadegh was a rebel against
the Shah.89 Project Ajax was a success. Mohammed Reza
Shah reclaimed his throne from his self-imposed exile in
Rome.90
Mohammed Mossadegh was arrested and
convicted of treason; spending three years in prison and
remaining under house arrest until his death in 1967.
Mossadegh was not the only casualty of Operation
Ajax, however, as the once friendly alliance between the
United States and Iran perished as well:
The reality of [the Iranian
people's] deep anger against
the United States in particular
can hardly be underrated.
And there were many reasons
for it. But the central reason
was that it was known as the
power
that
overthrew
Mossadegh's government in
1953, and it was wrongly
perceived to be the real
power behind, and the daily
instructor of the absolute and
arbitrary [government of the
Shah].91
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Thus, the United States accomplished its goal and aided
Britain in removing the democratically elected Mossadegh
from power and restoring to the throne the brutal Mohamed
Reza Shah. While, in the short term, this appeared to be a
victory for the United States and Britain, the Iranian people
would never forgive these Western powers for destroying
their best chance at democracy.

III. The Shah’s Iran – A Brutal Regime Supported by
American Interests
The successful coup d’état of Mohammad
Mossadegh’s government restored Mohammed Reza Shah
to the monarchy. By the late 1950s the Shah seemed
completely in control of Iran. After the Majlis elections
were fixed in 1956, there were only two political parties
allowed in Iran – the National Party, as the party of the
government, and the Peoples’ party, as the figurative
opposition. Both political parties were controlled by the
Shah and were known to Iranians as “yes and yes sir.”92
The Shah’s power, however, did not derive from the
political will of Iran. The United States was perceived as
the power behind his throne, manipulating the Shah
through military might, weapons sales, monetary aid and
capital investment.93 The Shah was fully aware that his
restoration to power by the acts of the United States left
him in thrall to the foreign power. The Shah specifically
thanked Kermit Roosevelt upon his reinstatement stating, “I
owe my throne to God, my people, my army – and to
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you!”94 While most Americans thought little of Iran during
this time, Iranians understood that the United States was the
power behind the Shah’s reign, perceiving the United
States as “the ghost in the machine, present even when it
was absent, pulling strings, making secret deals, changing
lives, bestowing boons, and providing cover for corrupt and
even murderous acts.”95
The Shah’s Rise to Power
The Shah’s reign was not easy, however, and the
Iraqi revolution in 1958 showed the Shah that he may be as
vulnerable as the Iraqi monarchy.96
Arab uprisings
throughout the region made the Shah nervous, so he
reached out to the United States and Israel as mutual
enemies of the Arabian radicals and the looming Soviet
Union.97 The Soviets were a genuine threat as the Shah
was fervently anti-communist and pro-American. With the
help of the CIA, the Shah formed the brutal Sazeman-e
Ettelaatva Amniyat-e Keshvar (hereinafter the “SAVAK”)
security agency, whose mission was to jail, beat, torture
and intimidate all of the Shah’s political opponents,
especially the remnants of the outlawed, communist Tudeh
party.98 The SAVAK’s international reputation was based
upon its “brutality, cruelty, and the macabre creativity of its
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torturers”99 This reputation for political torture became a
defining theme in the Shah’s Iran, as illustrated during the
Shah's interview with Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes, during
which the Shah grimly joked about not having the SAVAK
torture Wallace for asking difficult questions.100
Still fearful of the Soviet specter in Iran, the United
States ignored the brutal methods of the Shah’s dictatorship
and entered into a number of bilateral defense treaties with
Iran, beginning under President Eisenhower in 1959 with a
treaty that guaranteed American military intervention on
Iran's behalf.101 The Eisenhower administration’s support
for the Shah also included more than a billion dollars in
economic and military aid over the first seven years of the
Shah’s reign, as the CIA considered Iran a key strategic
center for monitoring the Soviet threat in the Middle
The Kennedy administration followed in
East.102
Eisenhower’s footsteps, but tied Iranian aid to economic
reforms and development, under the theory that the nation’s
poverty led to a vulnerability to communism.103 This
ultimately led to the Shah’s profoundly unsuccessful
“White Revolution” which was supposed to include land
use reform; profit sharing; electoral reform; the restoration
of women’s suffrage; expansion of literacy; nationalization
of forests; pastures and waterways; and education
99
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reform.104 The Kennedy Administration also pushed for
reduction in Iranian military spending, refocusing military
personnel into civic roles, and the CIA removing
themselves from direct interaction with the SAVAK under
the theory that the training was complete.105 The Shah was
not going to allow for any reduction in the power of his
secret police, however; and the Israeli Mossad immediately
stepped in to fill the void that the CIA had left behind.106
The tight military ties between Iran and the United
States were restored in 1972 when President Nixon went to
Tehran and named the Shah as the protector of American
military interests in the Middle East. This move essentially
gave the Shah an open access to American military
technology.107 The Shah spent approximately $12.1 billion
dollars on advanced American military technology over the
next four years, paying for the weapons with oil
revenues.108 In 1977, Iran purchased half of the entire
American arms export industry.109 President Ford would
maintain this close relationship, and by the time Jimmy
Carter became President of the United States in 1978, Iran
was the center of American military and economic security
in the Middle East.110
While the strength of the Shah’s relationship with
the United States was an asset in receiving aid and in
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foreign policy, it represented a lethal political weakness at
home. The anti-American sentiment in Iran remained
strong since the 1953 coup of Mossadegh, and the Shah’s
brutal regime did little to help the people forget their lost
chance at democracy.
The alternative to the Shah
coalesced in the form of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi
Khomeini, who used the failure of the Shah’s White
Revolution to rally his followers into demonstrations in
1963.111 In June of that year, Khomeini castigated the Shah
stating, “We have come to the conclusion that this regime
has a more basic aim; they are fundamentally opposed to
Islam itself and the existence of a religious class.”112 In
response, the Shah had Khomeini arrested, triggering mass
protests that ultimately led to a clash with the Shah's brutal
security forces who killed hundreds of the Ayatollah's
followers.113 Khomeini had become the face of the
opposition to the Shah and rose to the forefront of the
religious hierarchy.114
The next focus of the Ayatollah’s opposition came
in 1964, when the United States requested an arrangement
whereby United States soldiers stationed in Iran would
have immunity under Iranian law and would instead be
tried in American Military courts.115 This Status of Forces
Agreement was a fairly standard agreement, with the
United States having similar agreements in place in
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Germany, Japan, and South Korea.116 Anti-Americanism
was so high in Iran, however, that the agreement barely
passed the Shah’s hand-picked Majlis (with sixty-two of
one hundred and thirty-two votes against the measure and a
significant number of members abstaining).117 Khomeini
latched onto the agreement as proof that the Shah was
merely an American puppet stating, “[t]hey can no longer
call us reactionary. The point is that we are fighting against
[America]…. We must use [the agreement] as a weapon to
attack the regime so that the whole nation will realize that
this Shah is an American agent and this is an American
plot.”118 Khomeini received further ammunition just two
weeks later when the Majlis approved $200 million dollars
in loans from American banks to purchase more American
weapons.119 This debt, coupled with the Status of Forces
Agreement, led Iranians to recall Mossadegh’s prior
recriminations that the Shah was selling the sovereignty of
Iran to foreign interests.120
Khomeini took these feelings and used them to
inflame his supporters as he spoke in October 1964:
If the religious leaders have
influence, they will not
permit this nation to be slaves
of Britain one day, and
America the next. If the
religious
leaders
have
116
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influence they will not permit
Israel to take over the Iranian
economy…. If the religious
leaders have influence they
will strike the government in
the mouth…. They will not
permit America to carry out
these scandalous deeds, they
will throw him out of Iran….
Let the American president
know that in the eyes of the
Iranian people he is the most
repulsive member of the
human race…. Let the
American government know
that its name has been ruined
and disgraced in Iran.121
Just a few days after this speech, Ayatollah Khomeini was
arrested by SAVAK agents, taken to the Tehran airport,
exiled to Turkey, and then Iraq where he spent the next
thirteen years developing a network of anti-Shah activists
with the goal of making Iran an Islamic state.122
Even with Khomeini gone the dissidents remained
active in Iran. In January 1965, the Prime Minister serving
under the Shah was assassinated.123 Just three months later
there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the
Shah himself carried out by a member of his own imperial
guard.124 That same year the Mujahedeen-e was formed as
121
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a guerrilla movement made up of religious militants and
designed to carry out a terrorist campaign against the
Shah.125 Several smaller militant groups rose up as well.126
Despite this unrest, with the Ayatollah in exile and
the support of the United States firmly behind him, the
Shah spent the next decade expanding his personal wealth
at the expense of the Iranian public who lived in poverty
with an average per capita income of two hundred and fifty
dollars per year.127 This dichotomy of wealth was
highlighted in 1971, when the Shah hosted an enormous
gala to celebrate his thirtieth year as Shah and the 2,500th
anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire under
Cyrus the Great.
The extravagant celebration was
unbelievable in its excess:
Kings, emperors, princes,
presidents, sheiks, sultans,
and hundreds of immensely
wealthy jet-setters came to a
tent city the Shah had built on
the ruins of Persepolis. They
drank Dom Perignon Rose
1959 and Chateau Lafite
Rothschild
1945
from
specially designed Baccarat
crystal goblets while they
supped on poached quails
eggs stuffed with caviar,
crayfish
mouse,
roast
peacock
stuffed
with
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foiegras, and other delicacies
prepared by Maxim’s of
Paris. The Shah’s shindig
cost the Iranian people, a
majority of whom lived in
poverty,
some
$200
million…. a small group of
students that dared protest the
extravaganza were badly
beaten by the Shah’s security
force.128
With such gaudy displays of wealth by the Shah, while
surrounded by the poverty of the Iranian public, it is not
surprising that not even the fear of the SAVAK could keep
the opposition groups at bay.
The Fall of the Shah
The Shah's fall began with the election of a new
American President. Jimmy Carter was elected President of
the United States on a campaign of “foreign policies that
commensurated with the nation’s highest ideals.”129
Carter's view of foreign policy seemed almost a direct
rebuke of the American support of the Shah's reign:
Our people have learned the
folly of trying to inject our
power into the internal affairs
of other nations. It is time
that our government learned
that lesson too…. Never
128
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again should our country
become militarily involved in
the internal affairs of another
country unless there is a
direct and obvious threat to
the security of the United
States or its people. We must
not use the CIA or other
covert means to effect violent
change in any government or
government policy…. the
CIA must operate within the
law.130
To emphasize the change in philosophy, President Carter
specifically criticized the Shah’s human rights record and
objected to such prolific arms deals with a nation with such
a poor record.131 Carter’s viewpoint was a total divergence
from the way that the Shah had been treated under previous
regimes and called into question Iran’s role as the protector
of American military interests in the Middle East.132
The perception in Iran was that the new
administration did not support the Shah, and the Shah
reacted quickly by implementing reforms of his own brutal
policies, eventually even inviting the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International to
examine his newly improved practices.133 Subsequently,
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told reporters during his
visit to Tehran that the United States was pleased with the
130
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reforms on human rights that Iran was already making and
that sanctions on Iran were out of the question.134 The
Shah's quick reaction to the Carter Administration's
criticisms enhanced the perception that the Shah was a
puppet on the strings of the United States. The Iranians
saw that the Shah had been cowed into reform by the
United States and began to believe that the Carter
Administration would protect Iranians if they spoke or
acted out against the Shah.135 In reality, the Carter
Administration was unlikely to challenge the Shah, as it
already had its hands full with the oil crisis, the backlash of
the Vietnam War, and the nuclear arms race. It was the
perception of the Shah’s weakness that mattered to the
Iranian people, however, and they seized upon the
perceived weakness.
Newspapers began to question the Shah’s policies,
students began to protest against the Shah on campuses,
and groups began circulating letters of grievances, with one
newspaper receiving 40,000 letters in response to
publishing the question “What is Wrong with Iran?”136
Things continued to go poorly for the Shah when he visited
the White House in November of 1977 and thousands of
anti-Shah protestors interrupted the proceedings.137 The
protests were so intense that police had to use tear gas near
the Shah and the President, and remarks were made on the
lawn at the White House with tears flowing from the eyes
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of both leaders.138 While the meeting was still considered a
success between the dignitaries,139 the tear gas incident was
viewed by opposition groups in Iran as another sign that the
United States was close to abandoning the Shah.140
Just over a month later, President Carter was a guest
of the Shah in Tehran and gave an eloquent New Year’s
Eve toast to the Shah praising the stability of Iran, the love
that his people have for him, and in closing stated, “We
have no nation on Earth who is closer to us in planning for
our mutual security…. And there is no leader with whom I
have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal
friendship.”141 Some historians credit this toast by Carter
as the catalyst that set in motion the Iranian revolution the
following year.142 Khomeini pounced on the toast as proof
of both the Shah’s allegiance to the United States and
Carter’s hypocrisy due to his claims to be a defender of
human rights as he still embraced the Shah.143 The Shah
responded to Khomeini’s rhetoric against Carter by placing
an editorial in a newspaper that blamed all the recent
Communist and Muslim extremists, and foolishly decried
Khomeini directly as a foreigner, a drunkard, and a closet
homosexual.144 Following Khomeini's castigation of the
Shah's New Year's toast and the Shah's foolish claims about
Khomeini, massive demonstrations erupted in the Iranian
religious center of Qom, with the Shah's security forces
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responding violently, killing protestors, and several
respected mullahs.145
Chaos and violence overtook all parts of Iranian
society, with the Shah’s brutal tactics only fanning the
flames. The Shah demanded that Iraq banish Khomeini to
Paris, which resulted in the Ayatollah having even greater
freedom of access to the press and his followers than he
had in Iraq.146 The Shah became inconsistent in dealing
with the uprisings against him. In some cases, such as on
September 8, 1978, the Shah’s soldiers opened fire
slaughtering hundreds of protesters, while at other times he
attempted to open discussions with more moderate forces
of the opposition.147 When the Shah turned to his allies in
the United States amid the chaos, all that was offered was
Ambassador William Sullivan’s advice that the Shah
“reform his government to provide ‘effective’ economic
and social measures to show that ‘[he] could lead.”148
President Carter was also ineffective in dealing with
the Iranian crisis. He was torn between advice from his
National Security Council (hereinafter "NSC") advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski who advocated for direct military
action and from the State Department with Ambassador
Sullivan holding out hope that moderate pro-democracy
elements could be found to replace the Shah.149 As Carter
spent months indecisively listening to the debate between
the NSC and the State Department, the Shah, in November
145
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of 1978, took to the radio and television to apologize for his
“past mistakes, unlawful actions, oppression and
corruption” and pleaded with the opposition to “try to
protect the only Shi-ite country in the world through their
guidance and by inviting the people to observe peace and
order.”150 By the end of December, the Shah asked
Ambassador Sullivan bluntly whether the United States
would support a new hard line military government that
would end the revolution by a policy of brutal repression,
to which the Ambassador replied that the “United States of
America could not make such a decision for the Shah.”151
With the lack of any support from his American allies,
upon whom he had relied on for decades, the Shah was
simply incapable of any real action on his own. In
December of 1978, President Carter continued to seek more
opinions from more advisors and requested complex
studies on the situation as the Shah lost control of the
streets.152 On January 16, 1979, Mohammed Reza Shah
left Iran for the last time as the pilot of his own Americanmade Boeing 707.153
IV. The 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis
Just as the coup d’état of Mohammed Mossadegh is
the defining moment in the Iranian perception of the United
States, the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis is the defining moment
of the American perception of Iran. Both sides felt that
they are the more aggrieved and the other is the villain in
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the relationship.154 The impact of the Hostage Crisis was
far reaching and created an indelible mark on the American
psyche through the introduction of Islamic Fundamentalist
terrorism. The Hostage Crisis also aided Ayatollah
Khomeini in his ascension to power in Iran by allowing
him to cement a power base in zealous anti-Americanism,
and arguably ended the Carter Presidency after one term.
Historically, it also represented the first interaction between
the United States and the newly defined Islamic Republic
of Iran, setting the tone for decades of animosity.
The Rise of the Ayatollah
As United States Ambassador to Iran, William
Sullivan was intimately involved with the situation in Iran.
Sullivan immediately understood that the Shah’s
government was done and Khomeini was now the power in
Iran, but his pleas that the Carter Administration approach
the Ayatollah, as most other nations were doing, were
repeatedly refused by the President.155 Desperate to
maintain some relationship between the United States and
Iran, Sullivan cabled Washington stating:
You should know that
President has made gross and
perhaps irretrievable mistake
by failing to send emissary to
Paris to see Khomeini…. I
can
notrpt
[sic]
not
understand the rationale…. I
urge you immediately to joint
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[sic] Harold Brown in his
plea for sanity…. Failure to
act
immediately
could
permanently frustrate U.S.
national interest in Iran.156
Disgusted with this outburst from his Ambassador,
President Carter ignored his advice entirely and simply
waited to see whether the Shah’s recently selected Prime
Minister Shapour Bakhtiar could somehow keep the Shah’s
government in place despite the Shah’s flight from Iran.157
Bakhtiar did try to restore order, but his power was totally
based on the military power, and the Iranian military was
vainly looking to the United States for support and
guidance.158
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Rulloh Musavi
Khomeini returned to Iran from his exile in Paris and
approximately three million people lined the streets of
Tehran to greet him.159 On February 11, 1979, the last
units of the armed forces supporting the Shah's regime
surrendered and the Ayatollah’s victory was complete.160
To form a new government, Khomeini created a
Revolutionary Council intended to unify the various
factions that made up the revolution.161 The Revolutionary
Council began filling government positions, including
appointing Mehdi Bazargan, a liberal oppositionist, as
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Prime Minister, providing hope that a democracy might
flourish.162 However, as many government positions were
filled by taking members from the Revolutionary Council,
Khomeini filled the vacancies in the Council with
conservative Islamists loyal to him personally.163 Radical
Islamists also seized power through the formation of ad hoc
Islamist komitehs and revolutionary tribunals.164 These ad
hoc groups charged Iranians with anti-Islamic crimes,
enforcing sentences of execution, and other biblical
punishments, with no opportunity for the accused to present
a defense.165 Bonyads were also formed under the control
of radical mullahs; who seized all the wealth remaining in
the country to redistribute it to Khomeini and his
followers.166
These groups were enforcing Sharia law and the
will of Khomeini, even as the Ayatollah and his
Revolutionary Council were going through the motions of
setting up a legitimate democratic government in apparent
cooperation with more liberal groups from the
revolution.167 This attempt to include non-Islamic
viewpoints was merely a charade, however, and Khomeini
eventually issued a national referendum with only one
question to be voted upon: “Do you want the monarchy to
be replaced by an Islamic Republic?”168 While the more
liberal groups involved in the revolution, such as the
162

Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
164
Id. at 150-52.
165
Id. at 151-52.
166
Id. at 151.
167
Id. at 152.
168
Id.
163

101

Tudeh, the Kurds, the National Front, and Prime Minister
Bazargan’s Iran Freedom Movement, boycotted the
election. Twenty million Iranians voted with 98% in favor
an Islamic Republic.169 Seizing the opportunity, Khomeini
and his followers quickly formed a constitutional
committee and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born, with
Khomeini as its Supreme Leader.170
America’s Response to the Revolution
It was not until early October of 1979, that the
United States met with Iranian officials in New York to
attempt to normalize relations. The Iranians needed
American parts to keep their military functioning and
President Carter needed to save face after several foreign
While the Carter Administration
policy debacles.171
attempted to convince the Iranians that the United States
accepted their government and would not attempt an
overthrow, the Iranians demanded proof of good faith by
the extradition of pro-Shah Iranians in the United States
who they deemed to be criminals. 172 The United States
could not allow this as it would surely be a death sentence
to anyone who returned to Iran.173 Despite these areas of
impasse, the process of normalization proceeded fairly well
for some time with diplomatic relations between the nations
seeming possible.174
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While negotiations continued, the political situation
for the embassy in Iran was extremely difficult and it was
clear that any pro-Shah action by the United States could
have dangerous consequences.175 A United States Senate
resolution condemning the Iranian Revolution for human
rights violations had recently inflamed anti-American
vitriol, and the American Embassy in Tehran was already
the subject of constant graffiti and protest marches, with the
favorite slogan being “Marg bar Shah!” or “Death to the
Shah!”176 Under these strained circumstances, Ambassador
Sullivan warned President Carter that admitting the Shah to
the United States would eliminate any possibility of
normalizing relations with the new Iranian government and
“would confirm the worst suspicions of those Iranian
revolutionaries who assumed that the United States was
plotting to restore the Shah to power.”177 Department of
State Chargé Bruce Lainigren’s views were sought on this
matter, and he told the Department:
For us to give refuge to the
Shah would trigger massive
demonstrations against our
embassy. With luck they may
stop at that, without a
physical assault…. But there
could be no assurance of that,
since Iran’s regular military
and police forces remain
largely demoralized and
cannot yet be relied on to
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apply the force that might be
needed to prevent violence
against us.178
Despite these warnings, President Carter was concerned
with his growing reputation for weakness in foreign affairs,
and the Shah was very ill with cancer at the time. Carter's
Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, warned the President, “If
the Shah dies in Mexico can you imagine the field day
Kissinger will have with that? He’ll say that first you
caused the Shah’s downfall and now you’ve killed him.”179
The election-year political pressure on President Carter
won over the dire warnings from his diplomatic staff. On
October 22, 1979, Mohammed Reza Shah was granted
leave to enter the United States for treatment of his rapidly
progressing cancer.180 John Limbert, Former Deputy
Secretary of State to Iran, who would be among the fiftytwo hostages held in Iran for four-hundred and forty-four
days, had this to say about Carter’s decision to allow the
Shah into the United States: “In making this decision,
events suggest that officials of the Carter Administration
either did not understand the Iranian response or, having
understood it, decided to ignore it.”181
When news that the Shah had been admitted to the
United States hit the Iranian airwaves, anti-American
sentiment in Iran exploded with upwards of a million
gathering to protest at the embassy.182 Police could not
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keep the area cordoned off, and protestors pressed directly
up against the embassy walls.183 Khomeini, in addition to
demanding that the Shah be delivered to Iran through
official government channels, further inflamed the
protesters stating: “It is incumbent upon students in the
secondary schools and universities and theology schools to
expand their attacks against America and Israel. Thus,
America will be forced to return the criminal, deposed
Shah!”184 Newspapers in Tehran ran pictures of a healthy
looking Shah next to articles explaining that the Shah could
not have lymphatic cancer, “because everyone knew
Iranians did not even get that kind of illness.”185 The
perception in Iran was that the United States was preparing
to overturn the Iranian Revolution.186 With the crowds so
inflamed, the worst of the fears of Ambassador Sullivan
and Chargé Laingen’s fears came to pass.
America Taken Hostage
On November 7, 1979, members of the organization
Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam
(hereinafter the “Muslim Students”) marched upon the
American Embassy with images of the Ayatollah pinned to
their chests.187 At a pre-arranged signal, the Iranian police
guarding the embassy stepped aside and the students used
bolt cutters on the chains holding the gates of the embassy
closed.188
The students entered the embassy and
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immediately re-secured the gate; executing a wellrehearsed plan to take over the embassy.189 The students
indicated that they were merely participating in a peaceful
sit-in, leading the Americans within the embassy to lower
their guard until the students began seizing American
hostages.190 The Marines guarding the embassy were under
orders not to engage, unless their lives were in danger and
they were faced only with unarmed women marching
towards them.191 The Marines fell back to the second floor
of the embassy and secured themselves behind steel doors
with the remaining Americans.192 The Muslim Students
gathered outside of the steel doors and placed a gun to the
head of a hostage, threatening to kill him if the remaining
Americans did not surrender.193 The remaining Americans
contacted Bruce Laingen at the Iranian Foreign Ministry
who told them that they had no choice and instructed the
remaining Americans to surrender.194 Neither the hostagetakers, who had brought only three days’ worth of food, nor
the Americans taken hostage had any concept that this
ordeal was going to last four hundred forty-four days.195
The Reaction in Iran
Upon securing the embassy and their sixty-three
American hostages, the Muslim Students released a
statement:
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The Islamic Revolution of
Iran represents a new
achievement in the ongoing
struggle between the people
and
the
oppressive
superpowers….
Iran’s
revolution has undermined
the political, economic, and
strategic
hegemony
of
America in the region…. We
Muslim students, followers of
Ayatollah Khomeini, have
occupied
the
espionage
embassy of America in
protest against the ploys of
the Imperialists and the
Zionists. We announce our
protest to the world; a protest
against America for granting
asylum and employing the
criminal Shah…. for creating
a malignant atmosphere of
biased and monopolized
propaganda,
and
for
supporting and recruiting
counterrevolutionary agents
against the Islamic Republic
of Iran…. And finally, for its
undermining and destructive
role in the face of the struggle
of the peoples for freedom
from
the
chains
of
196
imperialism.
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While the words of the Ayatollah may have placed the idea
for the hostage-taking into the minds of the students, it is
clear that the motivation of the hostage-takers was the
memory of the 1953 coup against Mossadegh.197 The
conversations with the hostage-takers were frequently laced
with references to Mossadegh and his fall at the hands of
the CIA. The students believed that the admittance of the
Shah to the United States was the beginning of another
attempt to overthrow the new Iranian government.198
During the crisis, one of the hostage-takers responded to a
challenge as to why they were taking over the embassy:
“To teach the American Government and the CIA a lesson,
so it will keep its hands off other countries, particularly
Iran.”199 One of the hostages, Colonel Charles Scott, said
of his conversations with his captors:
It was a situation where the
truth
didn’t
matter.
Perceptions were much more
important. A large portion of
Iranian people believed that
the United States had the
ability to pull strings and
return the Shah to power….
when the Shah was admitted
to the United States, we
opened a Pandora’s box for
the hard-line revolutionaries.
They could say, ‘Look what
America did in 1953! They’re
getting ready to do it again!
197

POLLACK, supra note 23, at 154.
Id.
199
Id.
198

108

Another coup is in the wind!
They’re going to return the
Shah to power!’ ….It’s hard
for many Americans to
understand that the entire
Iranian
population
felt
wronged by the Shah, and by
America’s support of the
Shah.200
While the student’s political motivations seem simplistic in
many respects, Ayatollah Khomeini’s plans to use the
hostage crisis for political gain were much more complex
and far-reaching.
It does not appear that Khomeini directly
participated in the planning of the seizure of the American
Embassy; however, evidence does indicate that he was
aware of the plan ahead of time.201 The students had
approached one of Khomeini’s followers to ask for his
blessing on their planned activities, and the police presence
at the embassy was both reduced and overly cooperative.202
Regardless of his direct involvement, Khomeini seized
political advantage of the situation immediately. Prime
Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi,
both of whom were involved with attempts to normalize
relations with the United States, immediately called for the
return of hostages.203 In direct opposition, Khomeini made
his position clear stating in rhetoric that was to become all
200
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too familiar: “The Great Satan is the United States of
America. It is making much commotion and fuss….today
underground plots are being hatched in these embassies,
mostly by the Great Satan America….They must sit in their
places and return the traitor [the Shah] soon.”204
Blocked during all their attempts to end the
takeover by Khomeini’s inner circle, and with reports
circulating about their negotiations with American NSC
Advisor Bzezinski, Iranian Prime Minister Bazargan and
Foreign Minister Yazdi quickly resigned.
Khomeini
immediately interjected himself into the political fray, and
the Revolutionary Council took a firm grasp of the Iranian
government, eventually leading to conservative cleric Ali
Khamenei ascending to the presidency.205 The Muslim
Students were elated that their takeover had resulted in the
fall of the reformist leadership. They took their cue from
Khomeini and announced that the hostages would not be
released until the Shah was turned over to Iran.206
Khomeini had effectively used the national support of the
attack on the American Embassy to eliminate the moderate
elements of the Iranian government, and cement himself
and his council as the true rulers of Iran.
The Reaction of the Carter Administration
President Carter was at Camp David when he heard
about the takeover of the embassy, and he worked from the
assumption that the Iranians would quickly quell the
situation as they had done during a similar attack on the
204
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American Embassy the prior February.207 The President
was in the middle of a primary challenge from Senator Ted
Kennedy, and his first thought was for the political capital
that could be gained if the President were seen as standing
tall amid the crisis.208 As it became clear that the situation
was considerably graver than originally anticipated,
President Carter found himself in the familiar situation of
indecision before a split cabinet, with Secretary Vance
urging for diplomacy and NSC Advisor Brzezinski
advising on a variety of military options.209 Fortunately for
the President, the military options available were quite
limited and the diplomatic route was initially the only
reasonable alternative.210 Secretary Vance’s plan was to
gather international support against this illegal and
egregious attack on the embassy. 211 Support was freely
and universally given as the Iranians were roundly
castigated in the international sphere and deluged with
pleas to release the hostages.212 NSC Advisor Brzezinski
also wanted to impose severe sanctions on Iran, but
Secretary Vance initially blocked this effort with the
exception of freezing the shipment of military spare parts
that had been previously purchased by the Shah.213 Aside
from applying international pressure, which Iran virtually
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ignored, the initial response of the Carter Administration
was to hope that the crisis would resolve itself naturally.214
As the hostage crisis grew to be a media event that
transcended politics, President Carter continued to be
frustrated that his administration could accomplish nothing
to assist the hostages.215 The United Nations Security
Council passed a resolution calling for the release of the
hostages216 and the International Court of Justice directed
Iran to free the hostages,217 yet Iran stood firm. The
Iranians made four demands for the return of the hostages:
1) the return of the Shah to Iran to stand trial; 2) the return
of the Shah’s assets to Iran; 3) an end to American
interference in Iran; and 4) an apology for past American
crimes against Iran.218 Carter refused immediately and
quickly prohibited American purchase of Iranian oil, cut off
all non-humanitarian trade with Iran, and froze all Iranian
assets, about twelve billion dollars, held in American
banks.219 President Carter tried to gain support for these
sanctions at the international level, but was foiled by a
Russian veto on the United Nations Security Council.220
Without a Security Council mandate, even close European
and Japanese allies would not join in the boycott.221 On
March 25, 1980, an internal evaluation of the Carter
Administration foreign policy found: “[O]ur policy is
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neither coherent nor constant; on a number of specific
issues, notably Iran and the Middle East, we are in fact
losing momentum, with potentially very destructive
consequences for our interests.”222 According to a national
poll, President Carter was seen as an ineffective leader in
handling the crisis. In a poll taken a year before the release
of the hostages, seventy-four percent of Americans agreed
that Carter’s policy should be judged a failure if the
hostages were not released within three months.223
The Carter Administration’s efforts at negotiation,
headed by Secretary Vance, remained at a standstill, in part
due to a frustration that remains central to failures of
Iranian-American negotiations today. The Iranians, who
understood that capitulation to the United States was
political suicide in Iran, insisted that the United States
make concessions up-front and allow the Iranians to
respond as they saw fit.224 The Americans, in turn, did not
trust the Iranians to follow through, and insisted that all
negotiated concessions were to be made simultaneously.225
By April 1980, President Carter finally grew impatient with
diplomatic methods and turned to NSC Advisor Brzezinski
to devise the military option.226
Operation Eagle Claw
The rescue plan, codenamed Operation Eagle Claw,
involved eight helicopters and an assault force of 118 Delta
222
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Force commandos who would fly from the aircraft carrier
the U.S.S. Nimitz to the Iranian desert where they would
refuel from C-130 fuel carrying planes.227 The commandos
would then be transported secretly by the CIA via truck to
assault the embassy compound and rescue the hostages.228
Simultaneously, the helicopters would land at a nearby
soccer stadium, where the commandos would bring the
hostages for extraction.229 The helicopters would then fly
the commandos and rescued hostages to a nearby airbase,
where they would all board C-141 cargo planes to fly out
under escort of American Navy fighters. The Delta Force
commandos had orders to shoot all armed opposition
“twice, right between the eyes.”230 The commandos did not
get the opportunity to shoot anyone; however, as a dust
storm rose up disabling three helicopters and causing a
fourth to collide with a C-130. Resulting in the death of
eight American soldiers: and the rescue mission was
aborted.231
The political damage to the failed military operation
was significant, as the most visible attempt by the Carter
Administration to take action was a failure. Internally, the
damage to the administration was significant as well.
Secretary Vance’s opposition to military intervention had
been so strong that President Carter held the final planning
meeting while Secretary Vance was on vacation, excluding
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him from the process.232 Humiliated, Secretary Vance
tendered his resignation, effective after the attempted
hostage rescue, whether it was successful or not.233 The
Carter Administration briefly considered a second military
attempt, but ultimately decided against it concluding that
“there now was little way to press the Iranians to move
faster on the hostages than they wanted to.”234
The Response of the American Media and Citizens
The American media took a very aggressive
approach to the hostage crisis, led by ABC’s series of
special reports entitled America Held Hostage. America
Held Hostage highlighted coverage of the story with
passionate man on the street interviews expressing the
views of American citizens and a nightly display of the
number of days that the hostages were held captive.235 The
reaction of the American people was immediate and
universal, with longshoremen spontaneously refusing to
load cargo bound for Iran and the music industry
responding with a variety of songs from Pat Boone’s The
Hostage Prayer236 to Vince Vance and the Valiants’ Beach
Boys’ parody Bomb Iran.237
When Penne Laingren, the wife of Chargé Bruce
Laingren, told the Washington Post that she had tied a
yellow ribbon around the oak tree in her yard, America
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responded by tying yellow ribbons around trees, poles, and
lamp posts and by prominently displaying yellow ribbon
bumper stickers and clothing pins.238 In January of 1980,
an enormous, yellow ribbon was wrapped around the Rose
Bowl stadium in Pasadena, California, during the Super
Bowl as a show of support for the hostages.239 Interviews
with the hostages’ frightened spouses and children became
the most sought after news stories, with the interviews
delving into the emotions of the story rather than reporting
on the political realities surrounding the hostage crisis.240
This led to an intense national personalization of the crisis
leading Americans to “see themselves as victims of
‘terrorists’ who irrationally hate ‘us’ rather than to
recognize that Iranians had attacked the U.S. embassy in
response to the American policy in Iran."241
The Crisis Resolves Itself
Ultimately, the Carter Administration could do
nothing to resolve the hostage crisis, and the administration
returned to its original plan of waiting until the political
situation in Tehran resolved itself.242 Circumstances did
eventually arise that eliminated the Ayatollah’s political
need for the hostages, including the Ayatollah’s final
consolidation of power in Iran and the death of the Shah in
Egypt on July 27, 1980.243 The Khomeini had other
concerns as well with the launch of what would be an
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eight-year war with Iraq on September 22, 1980.244
Further, Ronald Reagan had been campaigning for
President with very tough talk regarding Iran. As it
appeared that Reagan would soon be the new President,
there was political incentive for Iran to finally end the
hostage crisis before the tough talk became reality.245
The final negotiations resulted in little actually
being offered for the return of the hostages. Essentially, the
United States merely pledged to not interfere in Iran’s
internal affairs and to release a portion of frozen Iranian
assets.246 Further, a large portion of the Iranian assets were
held in escrow to cover American legal claims against Iran,
and Iran ended up recovering only about $2.3 billion of
their more than $10 billion in frozen assets.247 Of course,
the hostage crisis provided Khomeini with the political
leverage to cement his leadership of Iran, and the Iranian
public enjoyed the psychological gratification of striking
back at the Americans for what the Iranians considered to
be decades of injustice.248 The Iranian value on the
psychological aspects of the hostage crisis is evidenced by
the fact that the Iranians did not return the hostages until
just after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President on
January 21, 1981.249 This left President Carter, who had
shown such disrespect to Iran and the Ayatollah and had
given shelter to the Shah, unable to claim that he had freed
the hostages. The psychological effect on the American
244
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psyche was severe as well. The average American was
unaware of the political realities surrounding the hostage
crisis and merely saw this as a random attack upon America
by a new, frightening enemy.250

V. After the Revolution: Iran and the United States
With the United States providing aid to Iraq during
the Iran-Iraq war,251 the Iran-Contra scandal,252 and Iran’s
policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution through the
support of radical Islamic terrorist organizations,253
relations between the United States and Iran continued to
flounder over the next two decades. However, an attempt
was made to normalize relations between the Khatami
regime and the Clinton Administration in the late 1990s.254
This effort culminated with Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright's public acknowledgment and apology for the role
of the United States in the overthrow of Prime Minister
Mossadegh.255 Clinton adopted the Iranian method of
unilaterally taking steps to ease relations, including
250
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liberalizing visa procedures, promoting cultural exchanges,
putting the Iraqi Mujahedin (MEK) on the American
terrorist list, allowing the sale of food and medicine to Iran,
allowing shipment of spare parts for Boeing aircrafts, and
lifting sanctions on Iranian carpets and foodstuffs.256
In response, Iran made some reciprocal gestures,
including ceasing the smuggling of Iraqi oil. In an
interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, President
Khatami acknowledged the 1979 hostage crisis by saying,
“I do know that the feelings of the great American people
have been hurt, and of course, I regret it.”257 Of course,
this half-apology came amongst a recitation of a long list of
grievances against America, going back to the overthrow of
the Mossadegh regime.258 Unfortunately, the conservative
Islamic population responded harshly to Khatami’s reform
government, especially to his overtures to the United
States.259 Eventually, Khatami gave into the pressure from
Iranian hard-liners and backed away from the conciliatory
measures as the Clinton Administration left power.260
Despite this initial failure, the George W. Bush
Administration continued the policy of attempted
reconciliation with Iran. Initially, the attack upon the World
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, ironically, brought
the United States and Iran closer to the table.261 The
Iranians were supportive of American efforts after 9/11 and
256
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assisted in Operation Enduring Freedom by allowing
American transport aircraft to use airfields in eastern Iran,
by performing search-and-rescue missions for American
pilots who ejected in Iranian airspace, and by allowing an
American freighter carrying humanitarian aid to dock at an
Iranian port.262 This cooperation eventually developed into
talks with the Iranians about issues outside of the conflict
with Afghanistan. Consequently, the Bush Administration
had unwittingly achieved the substantive, direct contact
with Iran that the Clinton Administration had been striving
for.263
Unfortunately, this accomplishment was short-lived
as a shipment of arms from Iran to the Palestinian
Authority was intercepted by Israel, which demonstrated
that Iran was still actively supporting terrorist
activityplacing it in direct confrontation with the War on
Terror.264 Three weeks later, President George W. Bush
named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil” in
his 2002 State of the Union address.265 This placed Iran
clearly on the side of the enemy as the United Stated
planned and executed its attack on Iraq in 2003, and the
animosity of the 1980s and 1990s returned in full force.
VI. The Past to the Present: Will There be War?
Reflecting on six decades of justified anger and
antagonism between the United States and Iran, it is clear
that both nations bear responsibility for the animosity that
262
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defines the volatile relationship between the two nations.
The primary issue that is bringing the current conflict
between the United States and Iran to a head is Iran’s
continued pursuit of nuclear weapons.266 Iran has
consistently and correctly stated that, as a signatory to the
NPT, they have an inalienable right to “develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination.”267 Iran has maintained that their
nuclear program, which was initiated by the United States
while the Shah was in power, is for strictly peaceful
purposes and legal under the NPT.268 If the Iranian nuclear
program were for peaceful purposes, the Iranians would be
correct and the United States would be in violation of its
own responsibilities under the NPT to assist Iran with the
continuing development of its nuclear power facilities.269
However, Iran continues to disregard its NPT obligations
through its denials of IAEA inspectors, leading to the
finding by the IAEA that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be
considered peaceful in nature.270
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The Calculations of War
The continued failure of Iran to comply with the
IAEA, which forms the basis for the U.N. Security Council
resolutions and resulting sanctions against Iran, also forms
the justification for a United States and Israel military
strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.271 The need for
action is immediate as the Iranian nuclear program is
quickly approaching the point where military action will
not be able to disrupt the production of nuclear weapons.272
Further, experts indicate that Israel cannot eliminate the
Iranian nuclear program alone and would require American
involvement.273 The United States must also consider the
related issue of Iran’s continued support of terrorism and
aggression against Israel.274 The ability of Iran to supply
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nuclear weapons to terrorists would represent a direct threat
to the national security of the United States.275 Considering
the national security concerns implicated and the available
justifications for war between the United States and Iran,
the prospect of armed conflict between the United States
and Iran appears to be imminent.
From a theoretical perspective, an evaluation of the
factors that lead to war indicate that the likelihood of
military conflict between the United States and Iran is quite
high. In his book Solving the War Puzzle, John Norton
Moore, legal scholar and the first Chairman of the United
States Institute for Peace, examined the empirical value of a
variety of theories exploring the causes of war. For
example, there is a significant correlation between the
occurrence of war and territorial contiguity.276 While this
initially may appear to lessen the likelihood of war between
Iran and the United States, the significant military interests
that the United States has within Iraq and Afghanistan
reduces the applicability of this theory.
Another
statistically strong correlation indicates that nations who
share economically significant, bilateral trade are much less
likely to go to war.277 With the significant sanctions in
place and the absence of any real trade between the United
for Hizbullah, Iran has also supported a wide array of other groups that
have attacked Israel).
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States and Iran, this correlation is, again, not indicative of
peace. The theory of the democratic peace, based on the
statistical correlation that there have been virtually no
significant wars between two functionally democratic
nations,278 also does not apply as Iran is an autocratic
theocracy and the United States is one of the more hawkish
democratic nations with a history of conflicts with nations
like Iran.279 In short, none of these modern theories of the
origins of war indicate that a peaceful resolution is likely
given the growing tension and historical animosity between
the United States and Iran.
Attempting to reach beyond these generalized
theories on the origins of war, John Norton Moore
developed his “Incentive Theory,” analyzing other relevant
theories on war to determine the incentives and
disincentives that influence nations, leaders, and regime
elites in the decision of whether to go to war.280 Under
Incentive Theory, a thorough evaluation of these incentives
and disincentives would result in the calculation of the total
level of "deterrence" that would prevent or encourage a
nation to go to war.281 To further develop Incentive Theory
into a tool that could predict the likelihood of war, John
Norton Moore encouraged Anthony Stenger, a student in
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Professor Moore’s War and Peace Seminar, to develop a
mathematical algorithm to determine the level of deterrence
in a given scenario. This work was further refined by
another one of Professor Moore’s students, Geoffrey D.
Fasel, with the resulting algorithm described in Annex I
below. The final algorithm created a range of results from 5.5 to +10 to describe the level of deterrence to war that
existed in a given situation, with a lower result indicating a
likelihood of war and a higher rating indicating a likelihood
of peace.282
When applied empirically to previously fought
wars, a level of accuracy was revealed that showed “no
situation in which a regime elite/decision-making body
subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive
military action and yet attacked.”283 Applying these
calculations to a situation involving Israel launching an
attack on Iran with direct support from the United States,
the calculations result in a deterrence rating of -1.47.284 To
evaluate this number within a frame reference: the Korean
War had a deterrence rating of -3.94; the Vietnam War had
a deterrence rating of -0.25; the Iran-Iraq War had a
deterrence rating of -1.53; and the Gulf War had a
deterrence rating of -3.38. With a history of intense
animosity between the nations, a deterrence rating of -1.47,
and Iran's development of nuclear weapons providing
justification for war, it appears very likely that an armed
conflict is imminent between the United States and Iran.
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VII. Moving Forward to Avoid War
Despite the empirical evidence indicating a
probability of war and the historical inability of Iran and
the United States to negotiate in a productive manner, there
is still hope to avoid further conflict and divisiveness
between these two nations. In the face of the threatened
military action, renewed negotiations have recently
commenced between the five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council plus Germany (hereinafter
the P5+1) and Iran.285 There is some indication that these
talks are supported by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei who is taking a lead role in the matter due to
an apparent rift between himself and Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.286 However, given the historic
failure of Iran to compromise in any fashion and their
reluctance to show any weakness in the face of pressure by
the United States, it is important that negotiators look to the
past for lessons learned as they approach these critical
negotiations with Iran.
Iranian Leadership Cannot Look Weak or Cooperative
With the United States.
Since the coup of Mohamed Mossadegh, antiAmericanism has been a core pillar of the Iranian view of
the world. Even the Shah would attempt to portray his
political enemies as American sympathizers in order to gain
285
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favor with the masses, and it could be argued that it was
President Carter’s New Year’s Eve toast praising the Shah
as a close friend that sparked the Iranian Revolution against
him.287 Likewise, it was the anti-American fervor of the
hostage crisis that provided the political climate that
allowed the Ayatollah to mold his country into a totalitarian
Islamic Republic. In short, Iranian leadership simply
cannot appear to be capitulating to the United States or they
will likely suffer a similar fate to the Shah. With this in
mind, any negotiated solution must seem a victory for Iran
against the United States, and prestigious to the Iranian
people, otherwise the Iranian leadership cannot acquiesce.
The Elimination of All Sanctions Should be on the Table
Given that it is the threat of imminent military
action that has finally brought Iran back to the negotiating
table rather than decades of sanctions, critics of the
sanctions regimes appear to have gained legitimacy.
Opinions regarding ineffectiveness of the sanctions on Iran
have included official government findings, such as the
2007 report of the GAO,288 and the advocacy of
nongovernmental organizations, such as Center on Peace
through its Director, Liberty Ivan Eland.289 At the same
time, the omnipresent sanctions have provided the antiAmerican factions within Iran with ample ammunition to
287

FARBER, supra note 24, at 139.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-58, IRAN
SANCTIONS, IRAN SANACTIONS, IMPACT IN FURTHERING U.S.
OBJECTIVES IS UNCLEAR AND SHOULD BE REVIEWED (Dec. 2007).
289
Ivan Eland, Iran Sanctions Won’t Work, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2012, available at
http://www,washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/17/iransanctions/wont-work/.
288

127

continually demonize the West. Further, as illustrated
above, the total lack of bilateral trade is a highly
destabilizing factor in the equation of whether or not an
armed conflict is likely to erupt between Iran and the
United States.290 With the only available outcomes in this
conflict being either historically unsuccessful diplomacy or
what will likely be a protracted war, all diplomatic options
must be on the table to entice the Iranian government into
abandoning their nuclear weapons program.
The
elimination of all sanctions may be exactly the sort of
capitulation by the United States that will allow the Iranian
leadership to claim a victory while coming into compliance
with their obligations under the NPT.
Western Nations Must be Flexible in the Nature of
Negotiations
A lesson learned by the failed efforts of the Carter
Administration during the hostage crisis is that Iranians and
Americans do not share the same understanding as to the
rules by which negotiations should proceed. The most
successful approach to Iran was President Clinton’s
administration unilaterally taking actions in hopes that the
Iranians would reciprocate, which ultimately set up Iranian
cooperation during Operation Enduring Freedom.291 As the
P5+1 approach the next round of diplomacy with Iran, they
should consider unilaterally reducing or eliminating
sanctions upon Iran as a show of good faith. The sanctions
can always be reinstated, and it would allow the Iranian
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leadership to claim a modest victory so that they may give
ground on more important issues.
The negotiations will likely not be passionless
legalistic affairs. Iranians are prone to flamboyant gestures
and political theater.292 It will be wise for the P5+1 to
allow for this and ignore the bold statements and grand
gestures of their Iranian counterparts, instead respecting
their cultural differences with the Iranians and allowing the
political theater to play its course. While American
negotiators often look at a negotiation process as a series of
transactions with the integrity of the process of central
importance, Iranians see the negotiation process as only a
means to an end, or even an obstacle, to achieving the
ultimate result.293 Thus, it will be important for the P5+1
not to let the process dictate the result, but instead to work
outside of the box towards the ultimate goal of termination
of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Iran’s Future as a Nuclear Nation
Another concession that should be simple for the
P5+1 to make is recognition of Iran’s right to have a
peaceful nuclear energy program. Under the NPT, Iran has
an absolute right to nuclear energy and all of the permanent
members of the National Security Council, as nuclear
weapon nations, have a duty to assist Iran in achieving
peaceful nuclear energy.294
Considering the Iranian
penchant for political theater, it is likely that Iranian
negotiators may demand apologies for American violations
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of the NPT through efforts to restrict Iran's inalienable right
to nuclear energy, while maintaining that their program has
always been only for peaceful purposes despite all evidence
to the contrary. To the P5+1 this may seem an affront to
the negotiation process and an intransigent position that
forestalls any compromise or resolution. However, to the
Iranians this would likely be merely a face-saving gesture
that shows they are standing up to the West while providing
a possible area of resolution.
Iran is correct as they assert their inalienable right
to a peaceful nuclear energy program, and any moves by
the P5+1 that limits such a right would likely be seen as an
assault on Iranian sovereignty and a sign of Western
imperialism that justifies their aggressive rhetoric. Even if
military action were taken to eliminate Iran’s suspected
nuclear weapons development facilities, Iran would still
have a right to a peaceful nuclear energy program. The
reality is that the P5+1 must find a creative solution that
will allow Iran to pursue its peaceful nuclear energy
program while assuring Israel and the United States that
Iran is no longer a threat to develop nuclear weapons.
An Aggressively Creative Solution
One extreme and unlikely example of a creative
solution that may account for Iran’s unique negotiating
ploys while achieving the goal of eliminating Iran’s nuclear
weapons program could involve the P5+1 offering
reparations to Iran for prior sanctions, with the reparations
creating true international oversight of the Iranian nuclear
power program. The reparations would come in the form
of the P5+1 investing resources to make Iran the central
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sponsor of the IAEA in the Middle East, establishing Iran
as a leader in peaceful nuclear energy technology. For
Iran’s part, it would cede to the IAEA full authority and
control over its nuclear sites at Arak, Qom, Natanz,
Isfahan, Bushehr, and Parchin,295 as well as any future or
unknown nuclear sites, with the P5+1 and the United
Nations fully funding IAEA activities in Iran. The IAEA
would work with Iranians to facilitate the mining,
processing, and enrichment of nuclear materials by
providing modern means and knowledge, while making
certain that no enrichment rises to the level of nuclear
weapons grade. With the IAEA deeply embedded in the
full Iranian nuclear system they would establish policies
and safety measures that would allow them to shut down
any part of the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle that they believe
is evolving towards the production of nuclear weapons.
Further, such an investment would require significant UN
presence to provide security for the international effort.
With such measures in place, the world could be
certain that the Iranian nuclear energy program is peaceful.
At the same time, Iran would gain the prestige and
significant economic advantages of becoming the nuclear
energy center in the Middle East and the knowledge that
the United Nations would act to protect its interests in the
event of aggression from any of Iran’s traditional
adversaries. Of course, the United Nations would also have
to act should Iran attempt to override the IAEA protections
in place to assure the peaceful nature of the program. With
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Iran certain that it would be defended by the United
Nations, nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel, Pakistan,
and India would pose a much less significant threat,
reducing the incentive for Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
With trade opening between Iran and Western nations and
the natural academic and diplomatic interactions that the
IAEA’s presence would require, Iran would naturally
emerge from its extreme isolationism. This could have
many positive indirect results as well, including the
liberalization of Iranian society and a significant reduction
or elimination of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism.
Such a solution, while extreme in its creativity and
virtually impossible to bring about, would satisfy Western
powers once and for all in that nuclear weapons
development by Iran is no longer a threat. This would still
play into Iran’s recent rhetoric that they do not want
nuclear weapons and Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent “fatwa”
on nuclear weapons.296 This is the sort of creativity that
may be required to avoid the otherwise likely alternative of
military intervention.
Conclusion
While a diplomatic solution is a possibility, it is
clear that the history of conflict and acrimony between the
United States and Iran makes war in the Middle East a
distinct possibility, if not a probability. Each nation has
legitimate and deep-rooted animosity towards the other,
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with the hostage crisis and support of terror placing Iran in
President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil,” and the 1953
coup of Mohammed Mossadegh and subsequent support of
the Shah’s brutal regime lending credence to Iranian
rhetoric that the United States is the “Great Satan.”
Aggravating the already hostile relationship between the
two nations is the imminence of Iran's development of
nuclear weapons in defiance of decades of sanctions and
their duties under the NPT. With Iran’s support of terror
and inflammatory rhetoric regarding its desire for the
destruction of Israel, the United States and Israel have valid
cause to consider military intervention. Various theories of
international relations, including the mathematical
calculations of Incentive Theory, indicate that, barring
some unforeseen diplomatic intervention, war is coming
between these nations.
Diplomatic
intervention,
while
historically
unsuccessful, is the last remaining hope to avoid United
States participation in a war in the Middle East. As such,
the P5+1 nations must look to the historical grievances
between these nations as well as the unique diplomatic
challenges that exist when negotiating with Iran, and find a
creative solution to prevent the impending conflict. Iran
will not be castigated into submission as their leaders
cannot be seen to capitulate to the United States and its
allies, nor will continuing the sanctions against Iran have
any positive effect on this last attempt at diplomacy.
Instead, the P5+1 must step away from traditional solutions
and allow Iran to appear stronger in their surrender of their
nuclear weapons program than they would appear should
they actually obtain nuclear weapons. Only with a solution
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in which Iran can claim some sort of victory over the West
can the Iranian leadership capitulate to the demands of the
United States. Without such a creative solution, war
between the United States and Iran appears inevitable.
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Annex I: Illustrative Methodology for Measuring
Deterrence1
These calculations represent the possibility of an attack by
Israel and the United States upon Iran with a victory being
defined as the destruction of Iran's nuclear weapons
program.
Table I: Local Deterrence Rating
Element
A= Israel
D= Iran

Initial Value
Selected
(Choose One)

1. D’s ability
to Prevent
Blitzkrieg
Victory by A.

a. D unable to
prevent
blitzkrieg
victory by A:
+0
b. D possibly
able to prevent
blitzkrieg
victory by A:
+1
c. D most likely
able to prevent
blitzkrieg
victory by A:
+2

Subjectivity
Multiplier
(Choose
One)
a. A
disregards or
does not
realize D’s
capability:
M=0
b. A realizes
and
appreciates
D’s
capability:
M=1

Total
Value
Assigned
(IVxM)
IV=0
M=1
Total=0

1

See Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 147-151. (This is an
adaptation by Geoffrey D. Fasel of an original methodology by
Anthony Stenger. The adaptation and the original were prepared as
seminar papers in collaboration with [John Norton Moore] in his War
& Peace and the Rule of Law Seminars).
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2. D’s Ability
to prevent an
Intermediate
Term Victory
by A.

a. D unable to
prevent an
intermediate
term victory by
A:
+0
b. D quite
possibly able to
prevent an
intermediate
term victory by
A: +.5
c. D most likely
able to prevent
an intermediate
term victory by
A: +1.5
d. D able to
prevent
intermediate
term victory
and respond
with serious
counterattack:
+3

a. A
disregards or
does not
realize D’s
capability:
M=0
b. A realizes
and
appreciates
D’s
capability:
M=1

3. Economic
Effect to A of
Attacking D:
Taking into
account
Level of
Trade with D
that A
believes
would be
lost, as well
as the overall

a. Substantial:
+.5

a. A’s
Regime
Elites can
insulate
themselves
from trade
loss (at the
expense of
the
population):
M=.25
b. A’s
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b. Moderate:
+.25
c. Negligible:
+0

IV=.5
M=1
Total=.5

IV=0
M=1
Total=0

size of A’s
Domestic and
International
Economy.

4. Domestic
Political
Costs to A’s
Regime elites
of initiating
War with D.

a. Substantial:
+.5
b. Moderate:
+.25
c. Negligible:
+0

Total Local
Deterrence
Rating: (Sum
total values
assigned for
l-4 above).

Regime
Elites are
unable to
externalize
these costs:
M=1
a. A’s
Regime
Elites are
insulated
from/ do not
care about
domestic
political
costs:
M=.25
b. A’s
Regime
Elites are
sensitive to
domestic
political
costs:
M=1

IV=0
M=1
Total=0

.5
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Table I(A): Extended Deterrence Rating
Table I(A)(1): Blitzkrieg Capabilities of D and Her
Allies
Element
A= Israel
D= Iran

Initial Value
Selected
(Choose One)

Subjectivity
Multiplier
(Choose One)

1. D’s and
D’s Allies
ability to
Prevent
Blitzkrieg
Victory by
A.

a. D and D’s
allies unable to
prevent
blitzkrieg
victory by A:
+0
b. D and D’s
allies possibly
able to prevent
blitzkrieg
victory by A:
+1
c. D and D’s
allies most
likely able to
prevent
blitzkrieg
victory by A:
+1.75
d. D or D’s
allies are not
only able to
prevent
blitzkrieg
victory, but D
or D’s allies
have the

a. A
disregards or
does not
realize D’s
capability:
M=0
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b. A partially
fails to
realizes or
discards D’s
capability:
M=.75
c. A realizes
and
appreciates
D’s capability:
M=1

Total
Value
Assigned
(IVxM)
IV=0
M=1
Total=0
Total
including
subtables:
0

capability of a
massive
military
response:
+2.5

Communication of Intent Multiplier
Choose all that apply and add
vertically. The sum in the box at
the bottom right is the
Communication Intent Multiplier.
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to
A, or Known by A, that Ally will
Assist D in the Event of an Attack
by A.
b. Formal Treaty Pledging
Assistance of D in the Event of an
Attack by A.
c. Membership in an International
Organization, the Charter of Which
Calls Members to Assist D in the
Event of an Attack by A (i.e.
NATO).
d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement
Regarding Consequences if A
Attacks D.
e. No Communication, Either
Positive or Negative on the Issue,
Despite the Presence of Strong
Economic Ties Between Ally and
D.
f. Ally Will Not Come to the
Assistance of D.

Applied?

Multiplier

No

.75

No

.75

No

.20

No

.20

Yes

.10

No

0
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TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY
DETERENCE RATE

.10

Credibility Multiplier
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose
all that apply, add vertically, and
apply the sum in the bottom right
(marked with an arrow) is the
Credibility Multiplier.
a. General Behavior of Upholding
Commitments.
b. General Pattern of Failing to
Uphold Commitments.
c. General Pattern of Upholding
Commitments Communicated in
the Same Manner as the
Commitment in the Scenario at
Hand.
d. General Pattern of Failing to
Uphold Commitments
Communicated in the Same
Manner as the Commitment in the
Scenario at Hand.
e. Pattern of Upholding
Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.
f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold
Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.
g. Upholding Commitment Would
be in Compliance with Generally
Recognized Principles of
International Law.
h. Upholding Commitment Would
Not be in Compliance with
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Applied?

Effect on
Multiplier

No

+.4

No

-.4

No

+.1

No

-.1

No

+.3

No

-.3

No

+.1

No

-.1

Generally Recognized Principles of
International Law.
i. Commitment Communicated in
Manner Making it Known to Other
Nations.
CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER
(add all applicable, thru i.).

No

+.1

0

Table (I)(A)(2): Immediate-Term Ability of D and her
Allies
Element
A= Israel
D= Iran

Initial Value
Selected
(Choose One)

2. D’s Ability
to prevent an
Intermediate
Term Victory
by A.

a. D and D’s
Allies unable
to prevent
intermediate
term victory by
A: +0
b. D and D’s
Allies possibly
able to prevent
intermediate
term victory by
A:
+1
c. D and D’s
Allies most
likely able to
prevent
intermediate
term victory by
A:

Subjectivity
Multiplier
(Choose
One)
a. A
disregards or
does not
realize D’s
capability:
M=0
b. A partially
fails to
realizes or
discards D’s
capability:
M=.75

Total
Value
Assigned
(IVxM)
IV=1
M=1
Total=1
Total
including
subtables:
1.1

c. A realizes
and
appreciates
D’s
capability:
M=1
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+1.75
d. D or D’s
allies are not
only able to
prevent
intermediate
term victory,
but D or D’s
allies have the
capability of a
massive
military
response:
+2.5

Communication of Intent Multiplier
Choose all that apply and add
vertically. The sum in the box at
the bottom right is the
Communication Intent Multiplier.
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to
A, or Known by A, that Ally will
Assist D in the Event of an Attack
by A.
b. Formal Treaty Pledging
Assistance of D in the Event of an
Attack by A.
c. Membership in an International
Organization, the Charter of Which
Calls Members to Assist D in the
Event of an Attack by A (i.e.
NATO).
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Applied?

Multiplier

No

.75

No

.75

No

.20

d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement
Regarding Consequences if A
Attacks D.
e. No Communication, Either
Positive or Negative on the Issue,
Despite the Presence of Strong
Economic Ties Between Ally and
D.
f. Ally Will Not Come to the
Assistance of D.
TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY
DETERENCE RATE

No

.20

Yes

.10

No

0
.10

Credibility Multiplier
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose
all that apply, add vertically, and
apply the sum in the bottom right
(marked with an arrow) is the
Credibility Multiplier.
a. General Behavior of Upholding
Commitments.
b. General Pattern of Failing to
Uphold Commitments.
c. General Pattern of Upholding
Commitments Communicated in
the Same Manner as the
Commitment in the Scenario at
Hand.
d. General Pattern of Failing to
Uphold Commitments
Communicated in the Same
Manner as the Commitment in the
Scenario at Hand.
e. Pattern of Upholding

Applied?

Effect on
Multiplier

No

+.4

No

-.4

No

+.1

No

-.1

No

+.3
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Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.

f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold
Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.

No

-.3

g. Upholding Commitment Would
be in Compliance with Generally
Recognized Principles of
International Law.

No

+.1

h. Upholding Commitment Would
Not be in Compliance with
Generally Recognized Principles of
International Law.

No

-.1

i. Commitment Communicated in
Manner Making it Known to Other
Nations.

No

+.1

CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER
(add all applicable, thru i.).
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0

Table I(A)(3): Economic Cost to A’s Regime Elite
Element
A= Israel
D= Iran

Initial Value
Selected
(Choose One)

Subjectivity
Multiplier
(Choose One)

3. Level of
Trade with
D and D’s
Allies that
A believes
will be lost
relative to
A’s GDP,
as well as
the cost of
waging
war against
D and D’s
allies to
A’s GDP

a. Substantial:
+.5

a. A’s Regime
Elites can
insulate
themselves
from trade
loss (at the
expense of the
population):
M=.25

b. Moderate:
+.25
c. Negligible:
+0

Total
Value
Assigned
(IVxM)
IV=.5
M=1
Total=.5
Total
including
subtables:
.55

b. A’s Regime
Elites are
unable to
externalize
these costs:
M=1

Communication of Intent Multiplier
Choose all that apply and add
vertically. The sum in the box at
the bottom right is the
Communication Intent Multiplier.
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to
A, or Known by A, that Ally will
Assist D in the Event of an Attack
by A.
b. Formal Treaty Pledging
Assistance of D in the Event of an

Applied?

Multiplier

No

.75

No

.75
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Attack by A.
c. Membership in an International
Organization, the Charter of Which
Calls Members to Assist D in the
Event of an Attack by A (i.e.
NATO).
d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement
Regarding Consequences if A
Attacks D.
e. No Communication, Either
Positive or Negative on the Issue,
Despite the Presence of Strong
Economic Ties Between Ally and
D.
f. Ally Will Not Come to the
Assistance of D.
TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY
DETERENCE RATE

No

.20

No

.20

Yes

.10

No

0
.10

Credibility Multiplier
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose
all that apply, add vertically, and
apply the sum in the bottom right
(marked with an arrow) is the
Credibility Multiplier.
a. General Behavior of Upholding
Commitments.
b. General Pattern of Failing to
Uphold Commitments.
c. General Pattern of Upholding
Commitments Communicated in
the Same Manner as the
Commitment in the Scenario at
Hand.
d. General Pattern of Failing to
146

Applied?

Effect on
Multiplier

No

+.4

No

-.4

No

+.1

No

-.1

Uphold Commitments
Communicated in the Same
Manner as the Commitment in the
Scenario at Hand.
e. Pattern of Upholding
Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.

No

+.3

f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold
Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.

No

-.3

g. Upholding Commitment Would
be in Compliance with Generally
Recognized Principles of
International Law.

No

+.1

h. Upholding Commitment Would
Not be in Compliance with
Generally Recognized Principles of
International Law.

No

-.1

i. Commitment Communicated in
Manner Making it Known to Other
Nations.

No

+.1

CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER
(add all applicable, thru i.).

0
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Table I(A)(4): Political Cost (to A’s Regime Elite)
Incentive
Type

Initial Assigned
Value

4. Domestic
Political
Costs to A’s
Regime
Elites of
initiating
War with
D’s Allies.

a. Substantial:
+.25

5.
International
Political
Costs to A’s
Regime
Elites of
initiating
War with
D’s Allies.

a. Substantial:
+.25
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b. Moderate:
+.10
c. Negligible:
+0

b. Moderate:
+.10
c. Negligible:
+0

Gain or
Loss
Multiplier
(should be
identical for
all incentive
types)
a. A’s
Regime
Elites are
insulated
from/do not
care about
domestic
political
costs:
M=.25
b. A’s
Regime
Elites are
sensitive to
domestic
political
costs:
M=1
a. A’s
Regime
Elites are
insulated
from/do not
care about
domestic
political
costs:

Total
Value
Assigned
(IVxM)

IV=.10
M=1
Total=.10
Total
including
subtables:
.11

IV=.10
M=1
Total=0
Total
including
subtables:

M=.25
b. A’s
Regime
Elites are
sensitive to
domestic
political
costs:
M=1

.11

Communication of Intent Multiplier
Choose all that apply and add
vertically. The sum in the box at
the bottom right is the
Communication Intent Multiplier.
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to
A, or Known by A, that Ally will
Assist D in the Event of an Attack
by A.
b. Formal Treaty Pledging
Assistance of D in the Event of an
Attack by A.
c. Membership in an International
Organization, the Charter of Which
Calls Members to Assist D in the
Event of an Attack by A (i.e.
NATO).
d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement
Regarding Consequences if A
Attacks D.
e. No Communication, Either
Positive or Negative on the Issue,
Despite the Presence of Strong
Economic Ties Between Ally and
D.

Applied?

Multiplier

No

.75

No

.75

No

.20

No

.20

Yes

.10
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f. Ally Will Not Come to the
Assistance of D.
TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY
DETERRENCE RATE

No

0
.10

Credibility Multiplier
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose
all that apply, add vertically, and
apply the sum in the bottom right
(marked with an arrow) as the
Credibility Multiplier.
a. General Behavior of Upholding
Commitments.
b. General Pattern of Failing to
Uphold Commitments.
c. General Pattern of Upholding
Commitments Communicated in
the Same Manner as the
Commitment in the Scenario at
Hand.
d. General Pattern of Failing to
Uphold Commitments
Communicated in the Same
Manner as the Commitment in the
Scenario at Hand.
e. Pattern of Upholding
Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.
f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold
Commitments with Respect to
Nation D.
g. Upholding Commitment Would
be in Compliance with Generally
Recognized Principles of
International Law.
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Applied?

Effect on
Multiplier

No

+.4

No

-.4

No

+.1

No

-.1

No

+.3

No

-.3

No

+.1

h. Upholding Commitment Would
Not be in Compliance with
Generally Recognized Principles of
International Law.
i. Commitment Communicated in
Manner Making it Known to Other
Nations.
CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER
(add all applicable, thru i.).

No

-.1

No

+.1

0

Table II: Potential Aggressor’s Subjective Incentives.
Incentive
Type

Military

Economic

Initial Value
Assigned

Gain or
Total
Loss
Value
Multiplier Assigned
(should
(IVxM)
be
identical
for all
incentive
types)

a. Negligible
a. Gain
perceived military
setting:
benefit:
0 M=1
b. Some perceived
military benefit:
+1
c. Considerable
perceived military
benefit:
+2
a. Negligible
perceived economic
benefit:
0

b. Loss
setting:
M=2

b. Some perceived

b. Loss

a. Gain
setting:
M=1

IV=2
M=2
Total= 4

IV=0
M=2
Total = 0
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economic benefit:
+1
c. Considerable
perceived economic
benefit:
+2

Emotional/ a. Negligible
Nationalism perceived emotional
Value
benefit:
0

setting:
M=2

No
Multiplier
IV=2

b. Some perceived
emotional benefit:
+1
c. Considerable
perceived emotional
benefit:
+2

Final
Incentives
Value
Assigned:
(Total of
TVA for
the three
Elements)
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Total
Incentive
Value =
4

Results

The Deterrence Value is calculated as the “Total
Disincentives” minus the “Aggressors Perceived
Incentives” for a total Deterrence Value of : -1.47

1. “Total Disincentives” is the sum total of the
following = 2.26
a. Total Local Deterrence Score from Table I =
0.5
b. Extended Deterrence Score (the sum of i-iv
below) = 1.76
i. Short term military capacity from
Table I(A)(1): 0.0
ii. Intermediate military capacity from
Table I(A)(2): 1.1
iii. Economic capacity from Table
I(A)(3): 0.55
iv. Political costs from Table I(A)(1):
0.11
2. “Aggressor’s Perceived Incentives” from Table II: 4
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